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HARNESSING THE POTENTIALS OF NIGERIA'S
OIL AND GAS FOR ECONOMIC !)EVELOPMENT

By
C. C. Ozumba*
It may be instructive at the outset to state that Nigeria's oil and gas potentials are
not too great by any standard of measure on per capita basis, for example, our crude oil
reserves is one of the smallest within the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) see Chart. Saudi Arabia with crude oil reserves of some 260 billion
barrels has a population of only 14.5 million. Iraq, with a population of 17.8 million
reports a level of 100 billion barrels. By contrast, Nigeria's reserves currently estimated
at 21 billion barrels is controlled by a population of close to 100 million people, and
apart from the deep offshore, prospect for a major oil find is remote. Similar pattern is
found in gas where Iran dominates the world reserve base with a relatively small
population. Nigeria's reserves are put at 164 trillion standard cubic feet with a large and
growing population. Because economic development is centred on people, frequently
measured as income per capita, it is immediately very clear that Nigeria's economic
development potential from petroleum is limited. This limitation is exacerbated by the
nature of petroleum itself being a wasting asset in the sense that once it is produced it
is not replaceable in situ, and unless it is converted to an income creating asset. it may
be lost for ever. Consequently, the growing over-dependence on oil for foreign
exchange earnings , government revenue and energy is the direct result of failures in
investing for economic diversification.
Nevertheless, some remarkable achievements have been made notably, the
development of social and economic infrastructure which are now crumbling because
of poor maintenance. It is important also to note that Nigeria has been able to establish
a stable co-operation framework with multinational oil companies which ensures
continuing oil production in the first place. More policy efforts, including strategic
initiatives are however, urgent, and it is my intention in this presentation to identify the
main thrusts, looking at the Upstream and Downstream of the Petroleum Sector.

• Mr. C. C. Ozumba is of the Corporate Planning and Developmelll Division, NNPC.
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THE UPSTREAM
A major policy objective in the upstream sector of Nigeria's petroleum industry
is the rapid expansion of the reserve base and production capacities in order to meet
the anticipated long-term outlook of the oil market. With this in view, we have set
the larget of expanding the nation 's reserves to 25 billion barrels and productibility
to 2.5 mbd for the year 1997. However, doubts have been expressed as to the
achievability of these targets under the current public sector financial constraints.
Rough estimates put the investment requirements at about $26 billion. of which the
Government's 57% equity interest is about $15 billion. In an attempt to resolve the
funding problem, various options and opinions have been expressed, including a
re-examination of current strategies.

1.1

Increasing Cost of Future Operations
Upstream activities in the Nigerian oil industry, had centered mainly on the
onshore Niger Delta Zone. However, as these oilfields, which were discovered
between two and three decades ago, attain maturity, and production declines in
response to rapid field depletion, production costs will definitely rise, especially
maintenance cost. It could be argued that new technological breakthrough may
slow down the rate of decline or maturity of the older fields, but that itself will also
be at a cost. Even if the relative rate is slowed down, the absolute decline of output
from these fields is inevitable.
As the producing wells or fields are drilled to deeper horizons, costs will increase
faster than output. This is due to the unlikelihood of more giant oilfields in the
Delta Zone, and explains the current efforts to extend the frontiers of oil ex ploration
and production to the unexplored Basins of Chad, Benue Dahomey and to deep
offshore areas. These areas are believed to be geologically more complex and the
terrains unfamiliar. Reservoir finds in such formations, can only but be at a higher
cost. Even though existing and potential technological trends will surmount some
of the challenges in these complex zones, the cost of technological acquisition,
adaptation or modification will still be high. For example, in geophysical surveys,
emphasis may shift to 3Doreven 4D, and Integrated Data Services Limited (IDSL)
- a subsidiary of NNPC plans to phase out 2D seismic surveys by 1997. The use
of satellites, lacer technology , desktop image processing systems and high-tech
drilling techniques that may reduce the long-run cost also require initial high
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capital cost. Again, the growing concerns about the environment will add to the
overall costs.
Thus, the industry is faced with the inevitability of high future upstream costs
either in current older oilfields or frontier areas even with modem drilling
technology and given probable stringent environmental requirements. We must
therefore exercise greater control over costs so that upstream margins are not
seriousiy eroded.

1.2 CashcaU Problems
Before 1987, Government had regularly financed its share of upstream costs
through direct cashcall payments to the Joint Venture Companies (JVCs), averaging
about $600 million annually. As delays and budgetary constraints started to
emerge. crude dedication was introduced to meet cashcall obligations. Given the
decline in crude oil prices, expansion of exploration programmes and emergence
of new cost items in addition to other budgetary requirements, the dedicated crude
option could no longer fully meet cashcall needs. Cashcall arrears started to mount
in 1993 and had averaged about $700 million by end of 1994. Consequently, in
1995, crude dedication wa~ abolished and all crude oil sales receipts paid into a
Government consolidated account. JV cashcalls payments were made 'first
charge' on this account. So far, the monthly instalmental mechanism put in place
in 1995 to meet 1995 cashcalls, the 1994 arrears and the Oso-NGL cashcalls has
proved effective, except perhaps for minor issues arising from exchange rate
variations which affect the local portion of the cashcalls. Although this arrangement
shows government willingne3s, commitment and flexibility in encouraging
upstream activities even in the face of serious financial constraint, the emerging
issues are indicative ofthe cash call obligations as a growing burden on government's
expenditure patterns.
1.3 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as Effective Instruments

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which is the basic upstream fiscal
package has been very effective so far. Initiated in 1986 in the heat of oil price
collapse, and revised in 1991 and due for another review in 1995. the MOU
resulted in a reserve increase from 16 billion barrels in 1986 to the current reserve
of about 2 1 billion barrels. Oil production also increased from 1.3 mbd to the
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current level of 2.0 mbd. The 1996 MOU review is to stream line the complex
computations into a simple tax law. It is also intended to provide additional
incentives to efficient operators with overall aim of further stimulating exploration
and production and encouraging inflow of foreign capital. However. fears have
been expressed by the JV Cs that the law may be inflexible and not susceptible to
frequent reviews in tune with competitive fiscal terms in comparable oiI provinces.

1.4 Alternative Financing Options and Implications
Aware of its financial limitations and the inadequacy of domestic savings.
government continues to adopt other possible options of stimulate upstream
financing. One of such current options is the Production Sharing Contracts (PSC).
especially in the allocation of new concessions. The PSC stipulates 30% cost
recovery oil, 40% tax oil and 65/35% production split on the remaining 30%
production. The immediate merit of this option is that the JVC bears all the risks
and costs. If a success is recorded, the JV C will then amortise these costs overtime,
which means that expected future oil revenues after cost amortisation, are likely
to be low. Secondly, even the expected lower future revenues wiU only begin to
come in after about five to ten years, considering the Ieadtime in upstream
operations. Thus, the avoidance of current exploration and production risk and
costs is at the expense of higher future oil revenues. which impact the Federation
Account. Another issue of a general nature is that production cost will continue to
be a contentious one, creating problem of monitoring and inequity. even under
existing arrangements.
'Cost of production· has ranged from between $2.5 - $3.5 per barrel and rising. Yet
JVC. both low-cost and high cost are producing under the same fiscal terms. If we
are to minimize costs consistent with crude oil conservation only low cost
prouucers should operate. However. the wide gap between crude cost and price per
barrel. in addition to our growing need for revenues require that the principle of
production rationalization be compromised.
Government divestiture. total and/or partial. in the upstream sector has.also been
suggested. It will be recalled that Government equity sales in 1989 and 1993 led
to the reduction of Government equity share in the JV Cs from 60% to an average
of about 57%. Government funds its 57% share of upstream costs. i.e. cashcalls.
through crude oil export revenues which is a major source of Government
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revenues. This means that further reduction in Government holdings, say to 51 %,
would mean lower cash-call commitment in addition to once and for all revenue
in government equity sales. Such equity reduction would minimize the financial
burden on Government, and release scarce resources for other sectors. it will also
encourage the return of indigenous private capital which are in foreign banks
abroad. However, it would be necessary to ensure an even spread of such sale to
avoid a situation where JV Cs will buy all the Government equity and thus be in a
position to use it against the interest of the nation. An example is in the peak of
cashcall arrears in 1994 when the JV Cs reduced their operation, and almost made
it impossible for the nation to meet its OPEC quota. Divestment in the upstream
would also have adverse repercussions in terms ofloss of control of the operations
of the Exploration & Production (E & P) companies. The nation may no longer be
able to flaunt its crude oil internationally as a political weapon if need be. There
could also be a possible reversal of the progress so far made in technology
acquisition and adaptation in the oil industry, and under such a scenario, Nigeria
can only scuttle all the gains made as an OPEC member including influence on
world oil price determination.
A feasible alternative to sale of government equity to the private sector is the total
commercialization of the upstream in which NNPC is allowed to buy the
Government equity wholly or partially and operate commercially like any other E
& P company, paying royalties, PPT and dividends to Government. This of course.
will need a re-capitalization of NNPC and full operational autonomy. Once
divested , Government should then concentrate on its regulatory functions,
operational and environmental regulations and ensuring the optimal use of the
country's vast oil and gas resources.
1.5 Greater Involvement of the Oil Producing Areas
Another emerging issue in the upstream activities in particular and oil operations
gene rally. is the increas ing volatility and hostility in the oil producing areas.
Perhaps. the time is ripe for these communities to have a feel of substantial stake
in the oi l. investments, ancillary operations, and revenues. This would enable them
actively take part in the development of their environment without grudges. It is
important to enhance the prospects of peace and stability in these areas so as to
sustain upstream operations.
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NIGERIA AND OPEC: ISSUE OF CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP

Nigeria joined the Organizatjon of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in
1971 and since then has remained a member. It is currently being argued that
Nigeria has a lot to gain by leaving the Organization. Firstly, as a non-OPEC
member, Nigeria would be in a position to increase oil production to whatever
level she wants since OPEC production ceilings would no longer be a constraint.
Consequently, Nigeria would then be able to maximize revenue from oil, especially
given the current domestic economic situation. This would imply a faster depletion
of Nigeria's oil reserve, which is expected to last less than about thiny years at
current rate of production; it would also mean expectations of high oil price.
However, Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with huge oil
reserves that can last over hundred years at current rate of production, prefer to
maintain stable real low oil price so as to discourage substitution of other energy
varieties for oil and eventually maximize the benefit from their huge oil reserves.
Such conflicting position an expectations could result in a ' production war' in
which Nigeria will be the obvious casualty.
It will be recalled that OPEC came into being in 1960 to co-ordinate and unify the
petroleum policies of member countries with a view to optimizing the interests of
its member countries. It also aims at oil price stabilization so as to ensure steady
income flows through efficient, economic and regular supply of oil to consuming
nations. OPEC could be said to have relatively achieved these aims, especially in
the l 970s and up to the mid-1980s before market forces began to assert themselves
in a permanent way. OPEC 's relative loss of control has been used by some
proponents to support the view that Nigeria should opt out of OPEC in order to
derive more benefit from her oil, like most non-OPEC countries.
It is further observed that Nigeria' s option out of OPEC, could lead to OPEC ' s
disintegration because other members would leave the Organization after Nigeria 's
withdrawal. This assertion may appear to be correct. Under such a scenario
Nigeria will suffer more. Each former member of the Organization will now be
fighting individually to capture part of the international oil market. Oil prices will
plummet, revenue from oil will fall and the present economic situation in Nigeria
will worsen. In fact, we will be back to pre-OPEC days of 1950s when oil prices
were dictated by oil consuming nations through the seven multinational oil
companies.
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If, on the other hand. Nigeria leaves OPEC and the Organization does not
disintegrate. Nigeria wiU then be able to produce at maximum capacity and sell at
the price prevailing in the international oil market. However, this will not be for
long as Saudi Arabia, with production capacity of over 10 mbd. will pump out as
much oil as her producti on capacity could perm it. This will weaken international
oil price and reduce oil revenue of Nigeria. given Nigeria ·soil production capacity
of only about 2.5 mbd. It should be noted that Nigeria relies heavily on oil revenue
and needs every dollar for the development needs of a teaming popu lation. There
is the temptation to point at Ecuador which left the Organization. However.
Ecuador is a marginal oil producer and a price-taker. On the other hand. Nigeria' s
production capacity does not make us a marginal producer because a complete
shut-down of all oils wells in Nigeria will have a significant effect in the world oil
market. And so. it would be better for Nigeria to remain in OPEC to add her weight
to decisions on oil production ceilings which eventually determine crude oil price.
OPEC is still relevant, and will remain so in maintaining stability in the international
oil market. With over three-quarters of world oil reserves at its disposal and oil
production in non-OPEC countries reaching peak. and heading for a decline.
OPEC's relevance and potency in the International market is therefore
unquestionable. Hence, it will be in Nigeria' s best interest to remain in the
Organization.

3.

NATURAL GAS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
Nigeria has abundant proven gas reserves estimated at about 164 trillion standard
cubic feet. and expected to last over a hundred years at current rate of production.
Although most of the activities in the Nigerian petroleum industry are concentrated
in the oil sector, Nigeria has rightly been described as a gas province. All gas
discoveries made so far are incidental to oil which has been the major focus. There
has been no deliberate comprehensive policy on natural gas development and
management, although a draft has been prepared for consideration. Therefore, the
first major issue in natural gas resource management and development is that of
the determination and quantification of Nigeria's actual gas reserves, and the
institutionalization of a gas development and utilization mechan ism. This requires
huge investment which the government alone cannot currently handle. This then
raises the question of how to make the gas sector attractive for investment, given
the capital-intensity of the gas sector.
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In order to attract the necessary investment to the gas sector, government should
first make operating oil companies in Nigeria undertake an integrative approach
to oilfields development with respect to oil and gas exploration. Oil producers
should show plans of how they would commercialize gas from their fields. Fiscal
incentives already granted to these oil companies to encourage them to comply
with such operational requirements have been generous, but needs to be updated
to make them even more attractive. There should also be a deliberate policy and
special incentive to encourage companies interested in prospecting for natural gas.
From the inception of oil production in Nigeria, most of the natural gas produced
was flared as there was no deliberate policy on gas utilization. At one stage, almost
100% of the gas produced was flared which amounted to 200,000 b/d of oil
equivalent. However, because of the efforts of government, gas flaring has been
reduced to about 75% currently, while only 13% is consumed and 12% re-injected.
At 75 %, Nigeria's gas flaring is one of the highest in the world. Many oil producing
countries which were in similar position as Nigeria in the 1960s and 1970s have
put in place strategies for reducing gas flaring or eliminating it. These countries
have been largely successful. Nigeria still has to tackle this problem in order to
minimize energy wastage. improve the immediate environment and contribute to
the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. A phased gradual reduction in gas
flaring for a period of say ten years should be strictly followed and the present
penalty rate raised for non-compliance. As much as possible all private sector
projects utilizing gas that would otherwise be flared should receive priority.
However, for gas commercialization to advance, we must be able to put in place
a pricing mechanising that is market-related while retaining an element of subsidy
to encourage domestic consumption to grow, and, at the same time, making gas
investment attractive as a profitable business opportunity. The key principle of gas
pricing is ability to pay by each consumer related to alternative price of energy in
use. The composite price must be at a level that allows gas producers a satisfactory
margin on investment.

In order to enhance gas export, tlie pricing formula should be such that, as a
feedstock or fuel, gas should be priced competitively in the world market. For
example, the envisaged West Africa gas pipeline from Nigeria through Benin
Republic, Togo and Ghana should be priced in foreign currency.
With regard to LNG, price is closely related to fuel oil price or pipeline gas in the
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consuming countries. In some cases the LNG price is indexed to inflation.
However, it is necessary here to note that currently, a number of projects to utilize
the abundant natural gas resource are being initiated. They include Methanol/
MBTE Plants, the Liquefied Natural Gas Project, the Natural Gas Liquid Project,
the Pipelines Network Extension, and supply of natural gas to some countries in
the· ECQW AS sub-region and tlie ·Petrochemicals. The ultimate intention is to
open the natural gas business to the private sector as government does not have
enough funds to invest in the downstream sector. For foreign private capital
injection, a marked improvement in our economic and political environment is a
necessity. In addition, government is prioritising the numerous gas projects and is
willing to set some funds to participate in joint ventures in order to stimulate
investment activity.

4.

REFINING AND DOWNSTREAM ISSUES
The combined installed capacity of the nation 's four refineries is 445 ,000 b/d,
while domestic capacity products requirements is about 300,000 b/d. The excess
refining capacity of 145,000 b/d designed for export remains available to thirdparty processors when all the bottlenecks for product evacuation are removed.
Some of our refineries are ageing. Refinery management is also beset with
technical and financial problems. Recently, there have been incidents of fire
outbreaks and industrial unrest, so that oftentimes, domestic products requirements
are not met by the refineries, resulting in importation of petroleum products. In
order to improve operational efficiency, some issues need to be addressed. These
include a possible change in management structure as recently mooted. Within the
framework of the 1995 Budget, government has introduced the concept of leasing
which is now being examined for its full consequences. Other considerations
include full commercialization by NNPC, joint ventures with foreign and indigenous
oil companies and privatization.
Commercialization would give NNPC sufficient autonomy and financial control
so that decisions can be made with despatch and in response to business
opportunities. It would ultimately mean that product prices be set at parity with
international prices for profitability. There would be a withdrawal of subsidy by
Government as crude oil sold to the refineries would have to be at international
prices whether the refineries are to be leased, operated as a joint venture company
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or privatized. The advantage of a liberalized petroleum products market include
revenue improvement which will allow early tum-around maintenance, and so
reduce costs, increased capacity utilization of the refineries, ability to carry out
preventive maintenance ofrefineries through the use of additional funds generated,
and regular supply of petroleum products in the country. Much is now said about
the freedom of the private sector to establish new refineries in the country, but this
can only take place in a deregulated petroleum products market and within the
framework of expectations for higher value added as substantial volumes of crude
oil exports are displaced. The issue here is whether the country is ready for a
deregulated petroleum market, in view of the socio-economic and political
consequences of sharp increases in prices. Where subsidies remain, government
would have to pay the operator the full equivalent loss of incomes.
It is, of course, the privilege of the government to provide petroleum products at
subsidized prices especially because they are considered strategic and capable of
stimulating overall economic growth and development. In this case, government
would stand ready to absorb the difference between unit cost of production and
pump prices. At present, NNPC margin of N 1.70 per litre of products supplied is
considerably less than what is required to cover the full cost of acquiring crudes,
refining them, and bringing products to the depots. consequently, our revenues are
insufficient to maintain ageing assets in both refining and distribution networks
much less embarking on new projects. For the Corporation to regain control o.
refining and distribution of petroleum products and therefore avert shortages,
urgent actions must be taken along the following lines:
Government should fund the rehabilitation and maintenance of our refineries,
estimated at N13.2 billion plus $859 million. This can be provided gradually
over the next eighteen months.
NNPC should have a total of N5/Litre out of Nl 1/Litre current PMS price,
while Marketer's margin should also be reviewed to a level consistent with
cost increases in their operations.
NNPC requires an increase in crude allocation for domestic consumption
which was cut to 250,000 b/d in this year's budget.
Foreign exchange must be made readily accessible to NNPC by a·number of
ways, including deregulation of NNPC banking operations.
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All in all, it is intended that NNPC will remain a strong an vital national oil
company, developing policies and overseeing the interests of the government in
the petroleum industry. NNPC will be in operation. particularly in the downstream
as full operatoror in joint venture relationship with the private sector. Consequently.
it is continually restructured to make it more commercial. effective. pro-active and
to improve operational efficiency. In this way. costs and wastages would be
drastically reduced so that the Corporation can survive. remain competitive. and
make positi ve contribution to the society.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Considering the limited horizon for depleting Nigeria ·soil reserves, and that. gas
which is relatively more abundant has hardly been exploited. a number of strategies
need Lo be pul in place if we are to realise the full potentials of our petroleum resources.
These strategies can be summarized as follows :
Increase exploration efforts to discover more oil so as to enhance the reserve base.
Improve the effic ie ncy of oil extraction .
Prepare Nigeria for the gas era.
Promote domestic gas utilization and for exports.
Use energy efficiently and conserve oil for premium uses.
Impro ve operational effic iency of our refineries.
Ultimately. however. the conduct of domestic economic and financial policies including
an effective utilization of petroleum revenues will determine the extent to which
petroleum policies and strategies can bear fruit.

